图书介绍
Game Theory and the LawPDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本网盘下载
- Douglas Baird 著
- 出版社： Harvard University Press
- ISBN：9780674341111;0674341112
- 出版时间：1998
- 标注页数：330页
- 文件大小：15MB
- 文件页数：341页
- 主题词：
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图书目录
Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior1
Bibliographic Notes4
1 Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game6
The Normal Form Game6
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes14
The Nash Equilibrium19
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior24
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance28
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game31
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria35
Summary46
Bibliographic Notes46
2 Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game50
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction50
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment57
Subgame Perfection63
Summary75
Bibliographic Notes77
3 Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation79
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept80
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept83
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result89
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling95
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation109
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation112
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate116
Summary118
Bibliographic Notes119
4 Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information122
Signaling and Screening122
Modeling Non verifiable Information125
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules142
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules147
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules153
Summary156
Bibliographic Notes157
5 Reputation and Repeated Games159
Backwards Induction and Its Limits159
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems165
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation178
Summary186
Bibliographic Notes186
6 Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models188
Collective Action and the Role of Law189
Embedded Games191
Understanding the Structure of Large Games195
Collective Action and Private Information202
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking208
Herd Behavior213
Summary217
Bibliographic Notes217
7 Noncooperative Bargaining219
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade219
Legal Rules as Exit Options224
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations232
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options237
Summary241
Bibliographic Notes241
8 Bargaining and Information244
Basic Models of the Litigation Process244
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages251
Information and Selection Bias260
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information261
Summary266
Bibliographic Notes266
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law268
Notes275
References289
Glossary301
Index319